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Abstract
Of the 6000 products in the average supermarket, a few receive special
displays, advertising, and prices in a given week, but the great majority are
assigned prices by simple percentage markups within category, adjusted, if
necessary, for competitive conditions and special price endings. Missing is
any direct consideration of actual customer price response.
The advent of the Universal Product Code and inexpensive, machine
readable sales data by individual item promises to make possible the wide-
spread determination of customer price response by in-store experiment. This
in turn, opens up the possiblity of developing and implementing a more
adequate theory for setting prices.
Yet, stores should not set price in a simple profit-maximizing way
based on in-store measurements of price response. The reason is that the
customer may pay a high price once and then not come back to the store,
thereby creating a small short term gain and a large long term loss.
A two-stage theory addresses this issue by postulating that customers
once in the store purchase goods to maximize their utility.
This determines observable in-store customer price response. The store then
maximizes its profit subject to a constraint on customer utility delivered.
The level of the constraint becomes a policy parameter that determines, in
part, the attractiveness of the store to the customer.
It is shown that under this theory, the store can set prices of non-
featured items using a formula containing only empirical measurements and a
single policy parameter for all items. It is further shown that the prices
are efficient in the sense that for a given level of store profit no other set
of prices will permit higher consumer utility and, conversely, for a given
level of customer utility, no other prices will permit higher store profit.
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1. Introduction
If an OR/MS team from Mars should enter the typical U.S. supermarket
and measure sales response to price by varying shelf prices, it would be
surprised to find that the store seems to be pricing each item much too
low to maximize profit. The store acts as if the customer is considerably
more sensitive to prices than customer behavior in the store seems to indicate.
There is a reason for this. The store has a special concern. Even
though a customer, once in the store, may buy the item at a higher price,
will he come back? A pricing policy that maximizes profits taking into
account the problem of bringing the customer into the store may call for
much lower prices than would be implied by measurements taken once the
customer is there.
Supermarket chains go to great effort to project an overall impression
of low prices and good value for the money. They run newspaper ads featuring
reduced prices and set up special displays in the stores to emphasize sale
items. These are often real bargains with the store not infrequently taking
a net loss on an individual item.
However, the great bulk of items are not so featured and it is
necessary to have a pricing policy for them. By and large stores use a
simple markup over cost. This does not take into account customer price
response, and so, in an important sense is ignoring customer preferences.
However, since the store does not maximize profit on individual items, the
question arises whether individual price measurements have any meaning or
usefulness to the store.
The purpose of this paper is to contend that they do and to develop
the beginnings of a theory of how to use such information.
22. Notation and definitions
We look at the store's customers in aggregate and suppose a collective
utility function. For a fixed time period, utility depends on the quanti-
ties of various goods bought by the customer and the total money spent on them.
The quantities bought also represent the sales of the store since the customers'
spending is the store's revenue. Let
n = number of items
s. = quantity bought of item i (units)1
Pi = price of item i (dol/unit)
= (Sl'... n )
P = (P1 **' p n )
t =Ps ps = Si = total dollars spent in time period (dollars)
1We suppose the customers
We suppose the customers' utility function is
u = v(s) - w(t)
and further that v(s) is concave and w(t) convex. Then u(s,t) is concave.
For example, we mighthave v(s) = I v.(si ) with the v. and w functions shaped
as shown 1
as shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Components of customer utility function.
3Practically, the sketches mean that the more units of any item the customers
buy, the less they value an additional unit. In addition, the more money
spent in total, the more they prefer not to spend another dollar.
Although virtually all items in a supermarket are sold in discrete units,
we take all quantities to be continuous to avoid useless complexities.
3. Customers' problem once in the store
The customers are assumed to make purchases to maximize their aggregate
utility, given the prevailing prices in the store. In other words, for fixed
P = (P1 ... Pn) they solve:
C1: Find s to
max u = v(s) - v(p.s)
subject to s >, 0.
The concavity of u guarantees a global maximum for some set of purchased
quantities s.
Since the store will not carry items it cannot sell, we shall assume that
the solution of C1 leads to s > 0. Then the maximum is an interiorpoint and
satisfies the necessary conditions
dv - w'(t) p. = 0 i = 1, ... n (2.1)ds. 
where w' = dw/dt and t = p.s
Repeated solution of C1 for various prices p develops the customers'
price response functions:
Si = si(p) = sales of item i when items are priced P=(P1 ... n)
11 1 n
4These in turn imply a total customer spending (store dollar sales) of
t(p) = Pisi(p).
i
The functions si(P) are those we believe a store might feasibly measure by
in-store experiment.
The general shape of si(p) would presumably be:
Si (P)
Pi
Fig. 2. Price response function.
3. Store's problem given customer in store
The store's problem is, given the way customers respond to price, to set
those prices. We investigate several methods for doing this. In this section
we again assume the customer is in the store.
3.1 Maximizing Customers' Utility Subject to Profit Constraint:
Suppose the store somehow knows the customers utility function and chooses
to maximize it subject to making a fixed profit. Then the store solves:
S1: Find to
max u = v(s(p)) - w(t(p))
s.t. I (Pi-Ci) Si() > T (Sl.1)
i
(S1.2)P > 0O
5where ci = incremental cost to the store of item i (dol/item)
C = (C1,.. ,cn )
T= minimum profit for store (dollars).
t () = p.s(P)
Since customer utility can always be increased by decreasing prices, maximum
utility will be reached only when the profit constraint is satisfied by equality
and so, without loss of optimality, we can replace the inequality with equality
in (Sl.1). Furthermore a solution with any prices zero would mean the store
should not stock the product. Therefore, we suppose in any real solution
> 0 and use this fact as convenient.
3.2 Maximizing Profit Subject to Utility Constraint.
In this case the store would solve
S2: Find to
max = I (Pi-ci)si
s.t. v(s(>)) - w(t(P) > u (S2.1)
£ > 0 (S2.2)
where u = minimal customer utility.
We shall assume that (pi-ci)si(p) is concave in p. Also we can
i
again assume without loss of optimality that the utility constraint
is satisfied by an equality in (S2.1) and real situtations lead to > 0.
3.3 Equivalence of S1 and S2
Suppose u is the customer utility achieved in S1 by maximizing utility
subject to the profit constraint r = . We show that, if the same value of uis made the utility constraint in maximizing store p ofit in S2, then the
is made the utility constraint in maximizing store profit in S2, then the
6same sets of prices maximize customer utility in S1 and store profit in S2.
Furthermore, the maximal profit in S2 is T .
Theorem: If u in S2 equals max u from S1, the set of p maximizing 7T in S2
is the same as the set maximizing u in S1 and max = T .
Proof: Consider S1. Since at optimum p > o, constraints (S1.2) can be
ignored. Treating (Sl.l) as an equality and introducing a Lagrange multiplier,
A, we create the unconstrained problem
SlA: max L1(p, A) v(s(p))-w(t(p))
La + [(pi-ci)si (a)]
i
- u() + rr(R)
We solve SA for (A). This solves S1 if is chosen such that T(p) = T
Call such , 
0
A similar argument transforms S2 into the unconstrained problem
S2A: max L2 (, ) = I (Pi-ci) si()
+ [v(s(p)-w(t(p))]
= rr(p) + ipi u()
Solving S2A solves S2 when is chosen to make u(p) = u .
It can be seen that SlA and S2A are the same since X and are constants
as far as the maximization is concerned. In other words, S2A will be solved
by any p that solves
S2B: max (1/P)L2(p , u) = (l/1)r(p) + u(p)
P
7The RHS of S2B is just SA and so if p solves SA for , it solves S2A for
I = 1/A and conversely.
Therefore the specific values p( X ) and X , solve S2A with
o o
max L2 = T(P(X )) + (1/Xo ) u(P(Xo))
But u(p( X )) = max u and max u = u by assumption of the theorem. Thus
1/Xo is the required value of that makes u(a) = u and S2 is solved by
p( X ). Since we have already seen r(p( X )) = r we now know that any 
maximizing S1 maximizes S2 with max X = . A similar argument works the
converse: any p maximizing ff subject to u=uo will max u subject to = 0
and will give max u = u .
The above results display the tradeoff between the objectives of store
profit and customer utility and show the existance of efficient prices which
permit these objectives to be as high as possible up to the point of tradeoff
between the two. However, this development supposes the customers are already
in the store and their sales response to price s(p) is measured there. As
discussed in the introduction, a major issue is whether an individual customer
comes back to the store after shopping there or shops at the store in the first
place.
4. Customers' propensity to shop at store
We now hypothesize that although there are many ways to bring customers
to the store and keep them coming (e.g., special features, product variety,
cleanliness, pleasant surroundings, and friendly service) one important way
8is to provide low prices throughout the store, or better yet provide high
value of customer utility. Thus the store might choose to maximize customer
utility subject to a profit constraint or, as we have seen to be equivalent,
to maximize profit subject to a utility constraint. In the last form, the
value of utility, if it could be made operational, would become a parameter
which the store could adjust. Therefore, we proceed to find the prices a
store should charge according to the following assumptions: (1) the customer
is buying to maximize utility (i.e., behaving according to si si(p) from C1)
(2) the store is pricing to maximize profit subject to a customer utility
constraint as in S2.
Starting from the lagrangian for S2,
L2 (P )= i (Pi-ci)si(p) + [v(s(2))-w(s 'p)]
necessary conditions for a maximum include
aL2 asi
apj= s + (i-ci) apj
j i J
+ v si asi+ w' + Pi I oi asi apj w[sj + i ap ]= 
j = 1 .... n (4.1)
However, from C1
av
a - w Pi = 0 i 1,...n (2.1)si
Define elasticity and cross-elasticities:
Pi as.
= (4.2)
nj ) si ap
p. as
n i(P) = si P(4.3)ijsi apj
____1_______1_1_·1_111__1_______ 
9With appropriate manipulations (4.1) becomes
nj 4 (i-ci) Si
pJ = c. (4.4)
J ~j -T 1+ uw
This is not really solved for Pi since Pi appears on the right hand side in
nj (p), sj(p), nij (p), w' (p s(p)), and p(p). However, if we suppose
that these quantities vary slowly with Pi or, more relevant, that we will
measure ni , ij, and si at the current p and make changes from current p
rather gradually, then (4.4) is an appropriate calculation. If a Pi as
calculated does not differ too much from current practice then the calcu-
lated value can be expected to be very close. If the calculated Pi is quite
different, a step in the direction of the new value is indicated, at which
point new measurements would be taken.
All quantities in (4.4) are presumed measurable and known except w'.
Notice, however, hat pw' is independent of the particular item being priced
(i.e. of i). Thus, given the measurements, one constant sets all prices.
This constant expresses the store's desire to lower its prices to keep the
customers' satisfaction high and maintain store loyalty.
10
5. Measurement Issues
Is it practical to measure price response as required by (4.4)?
Today, no. Although many people have made in-store price response
measurements, the task requires much effort, particularly to collect
accurate sales data. This usually means taking inventory at the start,
tallying all quantities restocked on the shelves , and taking inventory
at the end.
By contrast the introduction of point-of-purchase sales recording
equipment drastically changes the situation. Sales in machine readable
form in great time and item detail are possible. The quantity of data
is, in fact, a little overwhelming and much needs to be learned about
handling it effectively for analytic purposes.
In supermarkets optical scanning equipment that reads the Universal
Product Codes (UPC) offers the prospect of automatic sales recording.
As of this writing, however, only 100 stores in the U.S. are equipped
with scanners so that we are not talking about an immediate revolution.
Yet, many stores have electronic check-out equipment on which it is
possible, with moderate special effort, to record sales by item. Therefore,
to investigate the measurement potential of UPC, we ran a 16 week, 8 store
experiment in a Boston supermarket chain in which daily sales and price
data were collected for the frozen orange juice category (16 items).
It is not our purpose here to do a full scale evaluation of the
potential of UPC data for marketing measurements, but we wish to present
preliminary indications that price measurements may be feasible and so give
a flavor of the basic data. Figure 3 shows frozen orange juice sales
in ounces for the 8 stores over the period July 12 to November 6, 1976.
Fig. 3
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Prominent is day-of-week variation, Saturday being the peak day. Also
evident is seasonalvariation, (e.g., down in August because of vacations),
and at least two noticeable special feature weeks (weeks ending Sept. 18
and November 6).
Figure 4 shows daily market share for two national brands: Minute
Maid and Snow Crop. Share lacks any substantial day-of-week variation
but now weekly special features jump out of the data as bumps in share.
The power of the data to support the analyses of features is clear.
Insofar as price measurement goes, the experimental design
examined the effects of changing the spread of price between national
brands and private labels (normally about 16%). Three treatments considered
were normal, larger spread and smaller spread. For a given treatment
prices were held constant for 4 weeks. Figure 5 shows what happened in
two pairs of stores. Store pair A received treatments: Normal spread,
large spread, normal spread, small spread, in that order. Store pair B
received the same except large and small interchanged. Plotted in the
ratio, national brand sales/private label sales, for each store pair
over the experimental period, scaled to make the normal treatment periods
average to 1.0.
Price effects are evident. In the second 4 weeks the small spread
stores show a substantial gain for national brands relative to the
large spread stores (solid line lies above dashed line). In the third
period, the stores come back together as both use normal spreads. In
the fourth period the treatments are reversed and so are the sales results
(dashed line above solid line).
Several remarks can be made. First, the price effects are
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Fig. 5. Effect of price changes on sales of selected
frozen orange juice items. In the first and
third 4-week periods normal prices were in
effect. In the second and fourth periods the
two pairs of stores had different prices,
switching roles between the two cases.
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detectable, at least in this instance. Secondly, response appears to
be quick, i.e. it shows up in the first week. Thirdly, the effect also
appears to be reversible: it disappears in the normal third period and
is reversed in the fourth period. Detectibility, speed of response,
and reversibility are obviously all key issues in designing on-going
systems. We certainly do not claim to have resolved all these issues
in general; much work will have to be done but these initial results are
encouraging.
6. Discussion
The theory developed here focuses on a central idea: a two-step process
for relating in-store response measurements to price-setting. A variety of
other considerations also enter pricing. These include competitive prices,
price ending effects, price-quality perceptions, and the concept of price-
quality categories to meet the needs of different market segments (e.g.,
good, better, best). Some of these effects might be incorporated in the
theory, others are probably best left for management adjustment.
A number of theoretical issues deserve further investigation. One of
these is disaggregation of the customers. Another is the explicit considera-
tion of competition: as competing stores vary their customer utility constant,
what happens to share and profit?
However, the main results have already identified a theory which
shows promise of providing useful pricing calculations based on empirical
measurements and a policy parameter.
